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I.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
1.

Robert Troy Jensen, Plaintiff, is an individual, residing in or around Cedar City,
Utah.

2.

Scott Smith, M.D., Defendant, is an individual licensed to practice medicine in the
State of Utah.
II.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-

2(4) and § 78-2a-3(j).
III.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
In this action for medical malpractice, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from a
physician in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment by the Defendant.

Both

Plaintiff and Defendant failed to designate an expert within the time allowed under the
default provisions for a discovery plan pursuant to Rule 26 U.R.C.P. 1999 Amendment.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue on appeal is whether or not the filing of an affidavit by a medical
doctor, though considered an individual not yet designated as an expert, was sufficient
under Rule 56(f) to survive Summary Judgment. Defendant asserts that the standard of
review is one of abuse of discretion based on a motion for additional discovery. No
1

motion for additional discovery was made, but rather, summary judgment was granted at
the trial court level. As such, the granting of Summary Judgment is reviewed for
correctness, with no deference to the Trial Court's decision. Mackintosh v. Hampshire,
832 P.2d 1298 (Utah App. 1992). All evidence is to be considered in the light most
favoring the losing party. Owens v. Garfield 784 P.2d 1187, 1188 (Utah 1989).
The second issue on appeal is whether or not Res Ipsa Loquitur may apply to the
facts at hand to survive Summary Judgment absent an expert to testify regarding the
standard of care. Again, a grant of Summary Judgment is reviewed for correctness, with
no deference given to the trial court's decision. Mackintosh, supra. All evidence is to be
considered in the light most favoring the losing party.
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

3.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

4.

Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
VI.
STATEMENT OF CASE

Plaintiff filed suit on or around December 5, 2003.

The parties engaged in

informal discovery subject to the default provisions of the 1999 Amendments of Rule 26
where the parties did not agree to a Discovery Plan and did not seek an Order from the
Court. The discovery conducted included multiple written discovery requests, and the

depositions of both parties. Defendant filed a designation of an Expert on or about March
21, 2006, and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on that same day for Plaintiffs
failure to submit an expert affidavit. The grounds for the Summary Judgment motion
were that without a designated expert, Plaintiff could not establish the applicable medical
standard of care. Prior to the decision of the trial court, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit of
Dr. Barry E. Gustin, M.D., regarding the standard of care, as well as a Designation of
Expert Witness. The trial court entered their Memorandum Decision and Order Granting
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 17, 2006.
VIL
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff began his physician patient relationship with the Defendant, Dr. Scott
Smith, in April of 2000, and later underwent a below-knee-amputation of his leg.
Defendant performed a center-line stitching of the amputation, without leaving a flap of
skin to wrap over the stump.

This stitching, as well as other elements of alleged

malpractice, led to the inability of the wound to heal and the inability of the Plaintiff to
use prosthetics. This open wound grew worse and ultimately required an above-knee
amputation. Plaintiff asserts that the applicable medical standard of care was breached by
the Defendant in performing the foregoing medical procedures.
VIIL
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's statement of the issues attempts unduly to broaden them so as to
dilute the attention that each assigned error merits. The issue before the Court of Appeals
3

is a narrow one. In the event of a Motion for Summary Judgment against a Plaintiff in a
medical malpractice case, must the affidavit submitted for the purposes of Rule 56 be one
submitted by a designated expert? An affidavit placing issues of material fact at issue
was submitted, prior to the ruling by the trial court, by a medical doctor intended to be
the expert witness of the Plaintiff, and as such, Summary Judgment under Rule 56 was
improper. At the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Barry Gustin, MD, had
not yet provided his affidavit regarding the standard of care in the foregoing case, hence,
the Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56(f). However,
as that affidavit was submitted prior to the ruling by the trial court, a genuine issue of
material fact was placed at issue by an affidavit of an individual not yet determined to be
allowed to testify as an expert or not.
IX.
ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff Can Establish a Right to Recovery Precluding Summary Judgment
Plaintiff filed his Affidavit and Designation of Expert witness prior to the ruling

on the Motion for Summary Judgment. The designation of an expert was tardy by both
parties, and the Judge never ruled on the Motion to Strike the Motion to Strike
Designation of Expert Witness filed by the Defendant. It is undisputed that medical
negligence normally requires establishment through expert testimony.

See Pete v.

Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah 2006); Dallevv. Utah Valley Rez'l Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d
193, 195-96 (Utah 1990).
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In his Reply Brief, Defendant states that the trial court properly ignored Plaintiffs
late expert designation based on the ruling of Arnold. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307
(Utah 1993). His reliance on that case, however, is misplaced. There are several factual
distinctions that illustrate the impropriety of Summary Judgment in the case at bar as
compared to that case. First, in that case, the Defendants had designated their expert
within the time required by the scheduling order, and second, the expert opinion of the
Plaintiff was excluded as a discovery sanction pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(B) which was
determined to be within the discretion of the trial court. To the contrary, in the case at
bar, neither party submitted their expert affidavit in a timely manner, and no Rule 37
discovery sanctions were requested or imposed by the trial court prior to the filing of the
Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, it is still not yet decided by the trial court
whether or not the Designation of the Expert of the Plaintiff should be stricken as the trial
court considered the issue moot.
Interestingly, this is the very issue that requires adjudication and makes a ruling on
a Motion for Summary Judgment premature. Were the Plaintiff to prevail in the Motion
to Strike by the Defendant, and the Plaintiff were to be allowed to present the expert
medical testimony of Dr. Barry Gustin, Plaintiff could proceed to trial and establish all
necessary elements of medical negligence. We must emphasize that "Litigants must be
able to present their cases fully to court before judgment can be rendered against them
unless it is obvious from evidence before court that party opposing judgment can
establish no right to recovery." Drvsdale v. Ford Motor Co.. 1997, 947 P.2d 678, 328
Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 329 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. More specifically, a Motion for Summary
5

Judgment is a harsh measure, and for such reason contentions of (a) party opposing the
motion must be considered in a light most advantageous to him and all doubts resolved in
favor of permitting him to go to trial, and (the) motion should be granted only when,
viewing the matter thusly, no right to recovery could be established.

Rule 56

Annotations; Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman* 1966, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 P.2d
807.
II.

The Filing of a Rule 56(f) Affidavit was the Proper Response to a Motion for
Summary Judgment
The ruling of the trial court stated that the reliance on Rule 56(f) was improper in

an opposition to summary judgment when the time frame for filing an expert opinion had
passed.

Rather, the court opined that a request for an extension of the discovery

deadlines was proper. However, this analysis is flawed, as absent a discovery sanction
precluding the expert affidavit submitted by the Plaintiff, a sufficient issue of material
fact is created by the affidavit of Dr. Gustin. In light of the holding that summary
judgment is a drastic remedy and should be granted with reluctance, the Plaintiff was
required to provide a single sworn statement to oppose summary judgment. (Housley v.
Anaconda Co., 1967, 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390; Webster v. Sill 1983, 675 P.2d
1170). Because Dr. Barry had not yet submitted his affidavit, a request for a continuance
or extra time to obtain the affidavit was necessary. (See Rule 56(f) U.R.C.P.). Had
Plaintiffs instead provided a Motion for an Extension of Discovery pursuant to Rule 6(b),
there still would not have been a sworn statement placing at dispute an issue of material
fact sufficient to overcome summary judgment. As such, Rule 6(b) could not possibly be
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considered a proper response to a Motion for Summary Judgment. Rather, in summary
judgment proceedings, the only two Utah cases addressing the issue held that failing to
properly request an extension of time for action under Rule 6(b) is not sufficient to
preclude the granting of Summary Judgment.

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation

Corp., 1973, 29 Utah 2d 274, 508 P.2d 538; Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v.
Blomquist, 1972, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019. Because moving for an extension under
Rule 6(b) would not create a genuine issue of material fact, such suggested response to a
Motion for Summary Judgment would be insufficient. (Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.). However,
by providing a Rule 56(f) affidavit, and later providing the requisite expert affidavit,
Defendant cannot make a "(s)liowing (as a) party moving for summary judgment (that)
preclude(s) all reasonable possibility that loser could, if given trial, produce evidence
which could reasonably sustain judgment for loser." Green v. Gam, 1961, 11 Utah 2d
375, 359 P.2d 1050.
If it were decided that the expert testimony of Dr. Garrett was excluded as a Rule
37 sanction for failing to designate an expert within the time allowed, the holding of
Arnold v. Curtis could properly be applied. However, as it stands, it is undecided as to
whether or not the affidavit of Dr. Garrett would be allowed as an expert affidavit. From
the prior conduct of the trial court, it has been accepted that late designations of experts
are accepted and still treated as expert opinions unless explicitly ruled otherwise. (See
Defendant's Designation of their Expert Witness March 21, 2006). However, for the
purposes of a Motion for Summary Judgment, an affidavit has been supplied which has
created a clear genuine issue of material fact. Award of summary judgment is only
7

appropriate if pleadings, affidavits, and other submissions of parties show that no genuine
issue of material fact exists and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of
law. Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co.. 1986, 714 P.2d 648. Whether the affidavit
raising an issue of material fact will be qualified as expert testimony is yet to be decided
in the pending Motion to Strike the Affidavit before the trial court, which was
erroneously considered moot after the summary judgment ruling of August 17, 2006. But
when there is no Rule 37 sanction precluding the use of the affidavit of Dr. Garrett, and
where a designation of an expert has been submitted and not yet ruled upon as to its
acceptability, all elements necessary to overcome a Motion for Summary Judgment have
more than been met.
III.

Res Ipsa Loquitur is not a Claim or Defense to be Raised Prior to Appeal.
Defendant cites Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983) in support of his

assertion that the applicability of the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur cannot be raised for
the first time at the Appellate level. However, Bangerter stands for the doctrine that no
new claims or defenses may be raised at the Appellate level. Res Ipsa Loquitur is a legal
doctrine that allows negligence to be inferred, and in the context of medical malpractice
cases, precludes the necessity of an expert opinion to establish the standard of care. Pete
v. Youmblood. 141 P.3d 629 (Utah 2006).
The question then, is whether or not the doctrine may apply to the foregoing facts,
which have already been pled in their entirety, and which need not contain an allegation
of Res Ipsa Loquitur. Id. The pleading of the facts arising to negligence give the
Defendant notice of the assertions being made against him, and the applicability of a
8

legal doctrine to those facts is neither a claim, nor a defense, and need not be raised prior
to trial for the doctrine to be provided in the jury instructions. Id at 638. "Although
certain claims and defenses must be pleaded expressly or with specificity, res ipsa
loquitur is not one of them." Id. at 639.
Considering such argument, Plaintiff relies on the factual scenario to discount the
possibility that Res Ipsa may or may not be applicable. Such a factual assertion by the
Defendant only highlights that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the standard of
care in the medical field understood and expected by a layman. See Pete v. Youngblood,
at 636.
X.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in Plaintiff/Appellant's opening brief and this reply brief,
this Court should reverse the District Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment and
remand the case back to the District Court for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of February 2007.
MATTHEW T. GRAFF & ASSOCIATES

Mark H.Graff
LJ>
A ttorneyfor Plaintiff/Appellant
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PROOF OF SERVICE
I, Jennifer Taylor, Legal Assistant, hereby certify that on the 5th day of February
2007,1 caused to be mailed, U.S. first-class postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of
the above and foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, to the following:
DAVID H. EPPERSON
DAVID C. EPPERSON
EPPERSON & RENCHER
10 West 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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